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Chapter 8
Modernism to Postmodernism 
and Beyond
Terry Eagleton began his 1996 critique of postmodernism by distin-guishing culture and history. “The word postmodernism generally refers 
to a form of contemporary culture, whereas the term  postmodernity alludes 
to a specific historical period” (vii). “Culture” in Eagleton’s usage seems to 
refer to the arts, broadly speaking. In this discussion, in contrast, “culture” 
designates the anthropological usage. Anthropological culture refers to what 
humans make: language, social institutions, ways of life, and so on. In this 
larger sense, culture forms humans’ primary ecological niche. The arts—
dance, literature, music, painting, and theater to name a few—encompass 
those human activities that are relatively more expressive. Expressiveness 
contrasts with the instrumental, those actions aimed at practical ends. It 
also contrasts with discourse. Discourse aims at description and explana-
tion, like the sciences both natural and social. An inescapable aporia for 
culture studies resides in a refractory character of culture: dividing it into 
parcels always leaves a good bit of overlap. Few human activities or artifacts 
are purely expressive, instrumental, or discursive. Expressive endeavors 
always contain discursive and instrumental elements, and mutatis mutan-
dis for the other categories. The arts, then, merely do more expressing than 
the nonartistic aspects of culture. They are less instrumental or discursive.
So understood, arts offer social analysts a different window from which 
to view the human panorama. A common, although not definitive, nature 
of the arts involves them in representation. Again, some arts are more 
representative than others, but representation gives analysts a chance to do 
some hermeneutic analysis. A painting, for instance, depicts some objec-
tive thing, even if the thing is as amorphous and abstract as an  emotion, 
but the depiction always reflects the peculiar viewpoint of the artists who 
are embedded in their own culture. In addition, artistic  representation 
has a degree of ambiguity, thus permitting a range of  interpretation, and, 
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therefore, reflexive analysis of the interpreter’s own culture. For example, 
Frederic Jameson (1991) offered several interpretations of Vincent Van 
Gogh’s 1887 painting A Pair of Boots. Jameson called the painting “one 
of the canonical works of high modernism,” and he identified the subject 
of the painting as “peasant shoes” (6). Seemingly simple references, but 
neither has a claim on objective validity let alone truth. Taking the simplest 
part, the painting’s title names the subject only as boots. They could be 
peasant shoes, or a factory worker’s, or, as they are hobnailed, a soldier’s. 
The arts are shot through with subjectivities. Science looks askance at 
 subjectivism, but it remains crucial to art’s value as an analytic tool.
Making a different distinction, Henri Lefebvre said modernism and 
modernity are contraries.
By modernism, we mean the consciousness which successive ages, periods 
and generations had of themselves; thus modernism consists of phenom-
ena of consciousness, of triumphalist images and projections of self. . . . 
Modernism is a sociological and ideological fact. . . . By modernity, how-
ever, we understand the beginnings of a reflective process, a more-or-less 
advanced attempt at critique and autocritique, a bid for knowledge. . . . 
Modernity differs from modernism just as a concept differs from social 
phenomena themselves, just as a thought differs from actual events. . . . We 
will therefore think deeply about modernity considered objectively and as 
an essence, stripped of the appearances and illusions of modernism. 
(Lefebvre 1962:1–2)
The distinction and analysis that follows here differs from that of Lefebvre 
only in being less sanguine about objectivity. Getting at objective real-
ity often requires recourse to appearances and illusion, because we 
humans live in a universe of self-constructed appearances and illusions. 
Our way out lies in lucid analysis, intellectually rigorous evaluation, and 
self- reflective interrogation of the phenomenological world we ourselves 
create. 
One effect of art’s contribution to culture pertains to lucid analysis: art 
rounds out and gives depth to discourse. Sometimes art offers informa-
tion on patterns not yet discernible at the level of conscious discourse. In 
this latter function, art resembles the role of dreams in psychoanalysis. 
Dreams provide a window to the individual unconscious; art opens onto 
the cultural unconscious.
Meanings and Definitions of Modernism and Postmodernism
We are at the ending of what is called The Modern Age. Just as Antiquity was 
followed by several centuries of Occidental ascendancy, which Westerners 
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provincially call the Dark Ages, so now The Modern Age is succeeded by a 
postmodern period. 
(Mills 1959:166–167)
Unlike most stories, telling the story of modernism starts best in the middle 
rather than the beginning. Modernism’s middle coincides with the middle 
of the twentieth century, the post–Second World War period. Mills saw it 
as the end of an epoch. David Harvey (1989), along with many if not most 
cultural critics, called it high modernism. Harvey offered a periodization 
of modernism. Early cultural modernism began in Paris after 1848; the 
heroic period ran from about 1910 to 1945, and high modernism from 
1945 to 1973. The periods are categorized by twists and turns. They are not 
ideal types, but collections of directions and trends. Harvey quoted Charles 
Baudelaire writing in 1863 that modern art “is the transient, the fleeting, 
the contingent; it is one half of art, the other being the eternal and immu-
table.” Harvey went on to say that the history of modernism has careened 
between the ephemeral and the eternal (1989:10). Accordingly, artists 
have conveyed and tried to contain the modern experience of time, space, 
and causality as transitory, fleeting, fortuitous, and arbitrary (11). Maybe 
because of its historical proximity, high modernism shows the efforts most 
clearly. On the one hand, efforts to contain the chaos of modernity came 
in the form of the modernist architecture of Bauhaus and the city plan-
ning of Robert Moses. High modernism of that sort exuded rationality, 
predictability, and control. It was the obsessive-compulsive part of the 
neurosis of the age. It was also the main target of the postmodernist critics 
who associated that particular turn with the hegemony of what they called 
metanarratives (Lyotard 1979). The problem with metanarratives, accord-
ing to the postmodernist critics, is that they totalize and legitimate. They 
subsume everything to particular viewpoints of a class, race, or gender. So, 
high modernist metanarratives were white, male, and bourgeois. 
Not to gainsay the critique; there is a good bit of truth in it. Nonetheless, 
it leaves out the other half of high modernism: the other face of the 
ephemeral-eternal duality, the hysteria opposing the obsession. 
All art is Janus-faced. It reflects and educates on the one hand, and 
it prophesies on the other. In its first, reflective mode, high modernism 
captured the culmination of bourgeois hegemony since modernism’s 
appearance in Europe after 1848. Its pedagogical function consorts with 
reflection. Art teaches its contemporaries how to see, as John Berger 
demonstrated (1972). Since the rediscovery of linear perspective in the 
 fifteenth century (Edgerton 1975), we expect to see depictions in depth. 
That innovation culminated in 3D movies in the 1950s. Seeing is not 
limited to the visual arts but carries the broader metaphorical meaning of 
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knowing. Art socializes and enculturates. Arts inculcate a way of knowing 
according to their own cultural-historic present. 
Pierre Bourdieu examined the beginnings of modernism in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Liberal mass politics emerged with bour-
geois triumph and growing hegemony. In continental Europe, Paris was 
its center. Modernist art reflected its political economy—a paradoxical 
mixture of liberation and control, predictability and constant change. 
The modernists sought autonomy for their art, away from the tradition of 
aristocratic patronage. Instead of patronage, they sought autonomy in the 
market. Thoroughly bourgeois, they also strove to escape the incunabula 
of capital and the market.
[I]n a field reaching a high degree of autonomy and self-awareness, it 
is the mechanisms of competition themselves which authorize and favour 
the ordinary production of out-of-the-ordinary acts, founded on the rejec-
tion of temporal satisfactions, worldly gratifications and goals of ordinary 
action. 
(Bourdieu 1992:68)
Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867) was a founder and spokesperson of 
modernism. “The political attitude of Baudelaire, especially in 1848, is 
exemplary: he does not fight for the republic, but for the revolution” (77). 
As Bourdieu put it, modernism represented a double rupture against 
aristocratic high art and against the facile and vulgar conventionality of 
the bourgeoisie. Baudelaire and the modernists promoted a symbolic 
revolution in which they refused to recognize any master except art in 
a vain attempt to make the market disappear (81). A century later, the 
modernist spirit culminated in Albert Camus’ declaration: Je me révolte, 
donc nous sommes (Camus 1951:36). In the standard 1956 translation, 
Anthony Bower renders this as “I revolt, therefore we exist” (22), but that 
injects an unwarranted ideology of Heideggerian existentialism. “I revolt, 
therefore we are” better preserves Camus’ meaning, and better captures the 
high modernist culmination of modernism. His manifesto also shows the 
cultural rift between the ephemeral and the eternal, a contradiction both 
irreducible and dynamic, much like the contradictions in the high capital-
ism of the postwar period. Moreover, modernism in the arts resembles 
the symptoms of neurosis. Neurotics suffer, perceive, acknowledge, and 
above all are conscious of their symptoms, but they do not understand 
their meanings or causes. Lefebvre’s argument that modernism is made 
up of the conscious parts of Western culture since 1848 refers to these 
symptoms, which everyone can see and know. Impressionism, Realism, 
and all the other isms of the modern age are the symptoms of its neurosis. 
MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND  135
Modernity, in contrast, allows a stripping away of the illusions, the analysis 
of the age’s unconscious. To continue the psychoanalytic metaphor, high 
modernism represented the working through of insights garnered during 
the modernity of the twentieth century.
Modernity
The onset of modernity coincides with the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899–1900. 
Within the next few years, Einstein’s theory of relativity, Picasso and 
Braque’s cubism, Schönberg’s deconstruction of music, Veblen’s econom-
ics, imagist poetry, and the social analyses of Durkheim, Simmel, and 
Weber tore apart and disassembled the prevailing consciousness. Despite 
Zygmunt Bauman’s claim that “[m]odernity was a sworn enemy of con-
tingency, variety, ambiguity, waywardness, and idiosyncrasy” (2000:25), 
modernity virtually demanded these conditions. Once Einstein dissolved 
space and time as rigid frameworks; Freud assured people that they did 
not know why they did what they did and thought as they did; and Picasso 
and Braque showed them they did not see reality; little remained of the 
comfort of bourgeois conventions. Modernity, far from offering metanar-
ratives, dissolved them. Modernity revealed that there is no privileged 
position, no eternal map, no vantage point; all is flux.
James Joyce’s Ulysses is exemplary. More than most artistic works, it 
thoroughly and explicitly encapsulates modernity’s problematic. Another 
literary work, Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman (1949), shows how 
high modernism provided a working through of the modernist  neurosis. 
Unfortunately, and unlike an individual psychoanalysis, the working 
through did not dissolve the neurosis. It converted it to a psychosis.
Joyce’s title obviously refers to a founding artifact of Western culture. But 
as soon as a reader dives in to Joyce’s immense tome, the contrast between 
it and Homer’s work is glaring. The Odyssey is an epic adventure, nothing if 
not a fascinating and exciting tale. Ulysses may be the most ( intentionally) 
mundane novel ever published. In Ulysses, “with all the trappings of an 
epic—masks, costumes, scenery—the quotidian steals the show.” One of 
three protagonists, Leopold Bloom’s, “overwhelming triviality is encom-
passed by the City (Dublin), the metaphysical speculations of ‘amazed 
man’ (Stephen Dedalus), and the spontaneity of instinctive impulses 
(Molly). . . . The I merges with Man and Man is engulfed in mediocrity” 
(Lefebvre 1968:3). Instead of a mythic hero, the Blooms and Dedalus are 
moderns. Instead of adventures, they opt for mere existence, although even 
that requires an enormous struggle. The modern self has been sacrificed.
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The level of mythology at which the self appears as sacrifice to itself is an 
expression not so much of the original conception of popular religion, but 
the inclusion of myth in civilization. In the history of class conflict, the 
enmity of the self to sacrifice implied a sacrifice of the self, inasmuch as it 
was paid for by a denial of nature in man for the sake of domination over 
non-human nature and over other men. This very denial, the nucleus of all 
civilizing rationality, is the germ cell of a proliferating mythic irrationality: 
with the denial of nature in man not merely the telos of the outward control 
of nature but the telos of man’s own life is distorted and befogged. . . . Man’s 
domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is almost always the 
destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken. . . . The irra-
tionalism of totalitarian capitalism, whose way of satisfying needs has an 
objectified form determined by domination which makes the satisfaction of 
needs impossible . . . has its prototype in the hero who escapes from sacrifice 
by sacrificing himself. . . . Everyone who practices renunciation gives away 
more of his life than is given back to him: and more than the life that he 
vindicates. 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1944:54–55)
Moderns confront this irreconcilable contradiction. The more they 
dedicate themselves to humanize the world, the more they dominate the 
world and each other, and thereby sacrifice their humanity. While striving 
to make life worth living, they give away its value. In the early twentieth 
 century, society no longer seemed rational. It had lost its function and 
meaning, it coherence and cohesion, and “Ulysses shows precisely the same 
lack of internal cohesion” (Moretti 1977:183).
Franco Moretti attributed these social conditions and their artistic 
representation to the historical crisis caused by “disappearance of the 
self-regulating market” (184). Aside from the doubtful reality of a self-
regulating market, modernity first flourished during the ascendance of 
monopoly capitalism and neocolonialism. Commodity fetishism rose to 
new heights as profits increasingly depended on consumer markets in the 
capitalist centers. The characters and action of the novel depict virtually 
every aspect of daily life, except production: “[I]n Ulysses, social relation-
ships appear only through the prism of consumption” (189). Mythic heroes 
are not made from flâneurs (Benjamin 1955). As Joyce strove to represent 
modernity, he “uses myth only to desecrate it” (Moretti 1977:192). Unlike 
Homer’s Ulysses who used wit and virtù to navigate the surrounding 
world and defeat mythic threats, Joyce’s Ulysses becomes Leopold Bloom, 
an apostate Jewish advertising executive who fecklessly succumbs to mod-
ern myths. Joyce’s style relies heavily on stream of consciousness. The 
novel shows characters who are “enslaved by arcane and uncontrollable 
forces: stream of unconsciousness would be a better definition. . . . Stream 
MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND  137
of  consciousness and the crisis of the ideology of the free individual meet 
under the ensign of advertising,” which boosts the commodity by making 
a fetish of it (195). Having sacrificed the self in pursuit of bare biologi-
cal existence, moderns try to buy themselves back through consumption 
of commodities. But like salty seawater that increases thirst instead of 
quenching it, the more they consume, the more they have to consume. 
The self becomes an ever elusive object that moderns chase but cannot 
retrieve.
It is, therefore, completely logical that stream of consciousness is eminently 
paratactic: the absence of internal order and of hierarchies indicates its 
reproduction of a form of consciousness which is subjugated to the principle 
of the equivalence of commodities. It indicates that use-values—the concrete 
qualities of any given commodity—are by now perceived as secondary. . . . 
What is left to fire the imagination and inflame desire is only the overall 
attraction of the chaotic and unattainable collection of commodities (197). 
The modern dilemma revolves around a search for authenticity in a world 
of simulacra where commodities, like the Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey, 
promise fulfillment. The Modern Ulysses, while searching for his life, 
only gets lifestyles. Joyce used words to reproduce “the same deranged 
mechanisms which governed society” (208). An industry grew around 
this modern quest: advertising, Bloom’s profession. In the 1920s, J. Walter 
Thompson was the world’s largest advertising agency. To quote from one 
of its internal newsletters: “To sell goods we must also sell words. In fact we 
have to go further: we must sell life” (Marchand 1985:20 citing JWT News 
Letter, Nov. 11, 1926, p. 261). In 1926 words created the image. Moreover, 
the favored advertising technique was “dramatic realism,” which imitated 
the style of romantic novels soon to be translated to radio soap operas 
(Marchand 1985:24). The technique relied on dramatizations or tableaux 
created by words. Performances usually used verbalization, and even when 
they did not, as in mime or silent movies, audiences understood them 
verbally. Performances in novels and soap operas exploited the quotidian 
in such a way as to provide a model for life. Life came to imitate art. 
Ulysses relates a single day in the lives of its main characters, June 16, 
1904. Arthur Miller’s play, Death of a Salesman, encompasses the same 
time span. Willy Loman is not an advertising executive but a traveling 
salesman. First published and performed in 1949, it is one of the pioneering 
literary works of high modernism in the postwar period. Willy Loman’s 
search for where his life took a wrong turn constitutes the play’s 
problematic. Willy Loman, aged 63, “cannot bear reality, and since he can’t 
do much to change it, he keeps changing his ideas of it” (Miller 1984:27). 
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“He is a bleeding mass of contradictions” (184). These observations are 
part of Christopher Bigsby’s introduction to the Penguin edition (1998). 
Estranged from his family, a self-perceived failure in his profession, he 
anguishes over his circumstances in the twilight of his life. Still, Willy 
Loman does not submit; he denies. “Denial becomes his mode of being. 
Whereas a tragic hero comes to self-knowledge, in Death of a Salesman 
Willy does not” (Bigsby 1998:xviii). Willy’s denial makes him a modern 
tragic figure. He refuses to submit, and denies his own being at the same 
time. The second, more personal and psychological denial befits the 
modernist neurosis. In an unrecorded television interview, Arthur Miller 
responded to a question about his own psychoanalysis by saying that he 
learned he did not know how to live. Neither does Willy Loman, but he 
refuses to give up. “[U]nder the bullshit of capitalism, this pseudo life that 
thought to touch the clouds by standing on top of a refrigerator, waving 
a paid-up mortgage at the moon, victorious at last” (Miller 1984:184), 
Willy Loman works through the neurosis of the age. Sigmund Freud 
once remarked that the goal of psychoanalysis was to substitute common 
unhappiness for neurotic pain, and that is what Willy Loman discovers. 
Leopold Bloom lived a life of trivial banality; Willy Loman one of painful 
anguish.
High Modernism
High modernism opened the possibility of self-knowledge and the pos-
sibility of dissolving the neurosis of modern capitalism. It did not and 
could not make possible their resolution. Willy Loman suffered because 
he did not know how to live, but the ability to overcome the sources of 
his unhappiness did not lie within himself alone. The main sites of Willy 
Loman’s suffering, his work and his family, are the main institutions of 
 capitalism. The one is the main site of production, the other reproduction 
of capitalist society. To ameliorate Willy’s anguish, those institutions have 
to change. Neither individual Willy Lomans nor art alone can change them. 
Their change needs social action. Without that, people face the prospect of 
being victims or executioners, suicides or murderers as Camus pointed out 
(1946:255–276). Referring to Hegel’s discussion of master and slave from 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Camus argued that once slaves recognize 
their condition of servitude, they can escape only by suicide or murder, both 
acts of rebellion (1956:144–145). Either people give up, escape by killing 
themselves, or enslave others. The predicament of the master-slave relation 
remains insoluble outside of nihilism so long as the institution of slavery 
persists. The absurd double bind has to convert rebellion to  revolution. 
“Actually, revolution is only the logical consequence of  metaphysical 
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rebellion, and we shall discover, in our analysis of the revolutionary move-
ment, the same desperate and bloody effort to affirm the dignity of man 
in defiance of the things that deny its existence” (105). Art can suggest and 
reaffirm the path of rebellion. “Art disputes reality, but does not hide from 
it. . . .  Art thus leads back to the origins of rebellion” (258).
But art and society, creation and revolution . . . must rediscover the source 
of rebellion where refusal and acceptance, the unique and the universal, the 
individual and history balance each other. . . . Rebellion alone, in the blind 
alley in which we live, allows us to hoe for the future of which Nietzsche 
dreamed: Instead of the judge and the oppressor, the creator (273). 
Rebellion realizes itself in revolution only when the world of master and 
slave end. Rebellion takes aim against servitude, injustice, and violence. 
“Already, in fact, rebellion, without claiming to solve everything, can at 
least confront its problems” (305). Rebellion must always be for  humanity. 
Love, species love, must, therefore, be integral to rebellion. If the Willy 
Lomans of the world would end their anger and anguish, they must rebel 
with love. If any one thing marked the rebellions of the late 1960s, it 
was loving rebellion. After all, summer 1967 was called “the summer of 
love.”
The Almost Revolution
The world approached the brink of revolution in 1968: Chicago, Mexico 
City, Paris, Prague, and other places had uprisings. They were met by force 
and crushed. It marked the beginning of the end of modernity, which took 
another several decades to die. But the almost revolution involved more 
than the spectacular uprisings and equally spectacular repression. Those 
uprisings were surrounded by assaults on the cultural front, as institution 
after institution first came under question and then under attack. The 
rebellions were neither planned nor wholly spontaneous. There was no 
master strategy. No metanarratives guided them. Therefore, the rebellions 
bristled with contradictions. In some cases, they consisted of refusals and 
negations, in other cases, alternatives. But no institution could rest easy 
during the 1960s, which inconveniently did not end with 1969 but in the 
early 1970s.
One of the most intransigent contradictions lay in the commodifica-
tion of counterculture. No sooner did a challenge to the social and cultural 
status quo achieve notoriety, that it, or at least its accessories, entered the 
market. The Black Panthers, for instance, challenged racial institutions. 
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Not only did the White power elite use the armed force of the state to 
destroy them, but their movement spawned a lively trade in black berets 
and leather jackets. It was to be expected. In a society so saturated by 
capitalism, everything becomes a commodity, even dissents against 
commodification (Frank and Weiland 1997; Frank 2000). Nonetheless, a 
strong theme running through the 1960s counterculture rebelled against 
commodification. Unlike Willy Loman who would wave a paid-up mort-
gage at the moon, the counterculture offered different kinds of households. 
No longer single (nuclear) family dwellings, the 1960s saw the growth of 
communes of all kinds, experiments with the family form, and even, at a 
fundamental level, alternative reproductive roles as the politics of sex and 
gender became a central issue in the latter years of the period. Frequently, 
one found a rejection of the acceptable twin roles of producer and con-
sumer as phony and vacuous. The derogatory “plastic” carried a heavy 
information load, referring to general phoniness and to the cheapened 
commodification of everything with a widely recognized allusion to an 
iconic movie of the time, The Graduate (1967). Therefore, the rebellions of 
the 1960s challenged almost all institutions and all forms of social control 
despite commodification, not because of it. A useful measure of the breadth 
of the rebellions comes from the reaction against them. The elites did not 
concentrate solely on politics and economics. The reactionary tactics of 
the 1930s that focused on labor movements and radical politics associated 
with popular discontent about class inequalities. In contrast, the reaction 
to the rebellions of the 1960s covered all fronts—political, economic, art, 
music, education, sex, families, and so on. The 1960s rebellions sparked the 
culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s. Why this should have been so illumi-
nates much about modernism, modernity, and its demise.
Revolts of High Modernism
The rebels of high modernism had at least one common goal, liberation. 
Although the liberatory theme pervaded all cultural sectors, few illustrate 
the point: dance, visual arts, and feminism. Each in its own way did not 
just offend conservative sensibilities, however much its critics claimed that 
as its main goal. Historically, cultural conservatism and political reaction 
do not naturally go hand-in-hand. Some of the most reactionary leaders 
of the Restoration, both the English of the seventeenth century and on 
the continent after Napoleon, led flamboyant lives and associated them-
selves with the artistic avant-garde. The reaction against high modernist 
revolts took a cultural turn because those revolts threatened capitalism’s 
colonized institutions. The culture industry had long since captured all the 
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arts, albeit some more than others. Feminism challenged essential parts 
of the social reproductive processes: the family, sex, and gender. The elite 
could not allow the cultural challenges to go unanswered, because they 
threatened critical institutions of social control and social reproduction.
Art
Psychedelia formed one of several axes of sixties rebellions. Humphrey 
Osmond (1917–2004), the British psychiatrist famous for experiments 
with LSD, coined the word. It derives the Greek psyche (mind) and deloun 
(to make clear). Sometimes categorized as hallucinogenic, their aficionados 
more often identified psychedelic drugs like LSD as mind or consciousness 
expanding. Bypassing the controversies over drug use and sixties revolts for 
now, psychedelic artists intentionally aimed at consciousness  expansion. 
Largely, this meant presenting the quotidian in a way that made for see-
ing it clearly. Concomitantly, high modern, psychedelic visual art com-
bined the everyday so as to efface the distinction between high and low 
art, a distinction that Theodore Adorno (1970) persisted in maintaining. 
“Unknown to one another, a group of painters have come to the common 
conclusion that the most banal and even vulgar trappings of modern civi-
lization can, when transposed literally to canvas, becomes Art” (Bourdon 
1989:110 citing Time 1962:56). Had Time published at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, it might have said the same of the Ashcan School 
(aka The Eight), who (metaphorically) painted ash cans—the most banal, 
even vulgar trappings of modern civilization (Zurier 2006). 
Arthur Danto (1997) gained notoriety for advancing the argument 
that art ended in the 1960s. His was not an empirical observation, but a 
philosophical one. Of course, artists did not stop producing or plying their 
wares. Referencing Hans Belting’s (1991) claim that people did not catego-
rize paintings as works of art until the fifteenth century, Danto pointed out 
that the history of art up to high modernism reflected a series of move-
ments or mannerisms. Throughout each successive period, the artist had 
only limited ways of presenting images. The end of art for Danto obliterat-
ed such restrictions. Therefore, the Ashcan School’s ash cans, alleys, and 
other vulgar ordinariness—maybe Toulouse-Lautrec’s similar vulgarities—
were, in Danto’s view, manifestos, protests against reigning conventions. 
Warhol’s soup cans and Brillo boxes, on the contrary, liberated art from all 
restrictions. “No art is any longer historically mandated as against other art. 
Nothing is any more true as art than anything else.” (Danto 1997:27). In the 
1960s, art reached an apotheosis of freedom for what counted as art, includ-
ing the socially profane, the everyday, what most people take for reality.
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There was a tremendous change in the fabric of society, a demand for libera-
tion which has not ended yet. . . . In my view pop art was not just a move-
ment which followed one movement and was replaced by another. It was a 
cataclysmic moment which signaled profound social and political shifts and 
which achieved profound philosophical transformations in the concept of 
art. It really proclaimed the twentieth century, which had languished for so 
long a time—sixty-four years—in the field of the nineteenth century. . . . 
One by one the terrible ideas of the nineteenth century have been exhaust-
ing themselves, though many of the nineteenth-century institutions of 
repression remain (131–132). 
Danto expanded on the concept in a reply to his critics. The end of art for 
him, did not mean that “there will be no more stories to tell after the end of 
art, only that there will not be a single metanarrative for the future history 
of art” (Danto 1998:140). By presenting Brillo boxes, Andy Warhol was 
not engaging in representing an image of a Brillo box. He was presenting 
a Brillo box. Danto claimed that he could not, philosophically, distinguish 
between Warhol’s boxes and Brillo boxes. That is, Warhol’s boxes embody 
their meaning, which is what C. S. Peirce said was iconic representation—
the image of the thing itself is the thing. Therefore, what Danto discovered 
was more than just the liberation of art, and thus its end, but a different 
way of seeing, a different way of communicating, and, ultimately, a differ-
ent consciousness. If Belting is right—that images were not conceived as 
art until the fifteenth century—then the different way of seeing ushered in 
by linear perspective served as a similar, albeit smaller, milestone. Danto’s 
end of art connects to the epochal change in human consciousness from 
logocentric to iconocentric. Images as art from the 1400s on became art 
for art in the mid-nineteenth century when, according to Baudelaire, 
artists had to abstract themselves and their work from social structures, 
which culminated in abstract expressionism. Pop art comes full circle 
when social life and art become indistinguishable. Anything can be art, 
and art can be anything. As revolutionary, pop art, while liberating, made 
art more  fragile. If anything could be art, then the lag between artistic 
innovations—the effect of shock value—and commodification disappears. 
As soon as avant-garde art appeared, it was always already a commodity.
Dance
Liberation from rigid boundaries between art and nonart was not limited 
to painting or even visual art broadly speaking. It emerged in all the arts 
and culture generally. Modern dance carried particularly revealing signifi-
cance. Modern dance emerged in the first part of the twentieth century 
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as a rebellion against classical ballet. Led by American women—notably 
Isadora Duncan, Ruth St. Denis, and Martha Graham—modern dance 
focused on expression rather than technical virtuosity. It uses freer move-
ments governed more by expression of mood as opposed ballet’s  codified 
movements. Graham in particular emphasized the meaningfulness of every 
gesture (Ross 2003:25). That concept resulted in highly stylized forms. 
In the 1960s a revolutionary choreographic mode appeared. Just as 
pop art treated the ordinary as art so did the new dance. “One of the most 
shocking aspects of avant-garde art in the 1960s was its conspicuous use of 
ordinary gestures, actions, rhythms, and objects” (Banes 2003:3). Building 
on Victor Shlovsky’s concept of defamiliarization (1929), Sally Banes 
argued that defamiliarization of the ordinary, incidentally a psychological 
effect of psychedelic drugs, can also refamiliarize—that is, demystify, mak-
ing poetry prosaic and art in general intelligible, accessible, and politically 
engaged (19 n4). Obviously artistic refamiliarization holds the potential of 
demystifying commodities. Consequently, even as avant-garde art of the 
1960s became already commodified, it could demystify itself. One of the 
ways dance achieved this end involved using ordinary movements. Instead 
of a dancer moving as a character in a drama, “[s]he walks as though she’s 
in the street” (3). The rebellious artists of the 1960s tried to transform 
art from the sacred into the profane, nullify the gulf between art and the 
quotidian, and subvert commodification. “‘Un-art’ liberates the artist from 
conventional modernism. . . . ‘As un-art takes a lifelike form and setting, 
as it begins to function in the world as if it were life, we can speculate 
that art and all its resonances may one day become unnecessary’” (Banes 
2003:17 quoting Krapow 1990:144). By the same token, Allan Krapow’s 
un-art strategy holds forth a promise of making the world artistic instead 
of a commodity.
According to Noël Carroll, when choreographers in the 1960s chal-
lenged the distinction between dance and ordinary gestures, they made 
the same commitment as pop art. He cited Judith Dunn’s Acapulco, Steve 
Paxton’s Satisfying Lover and Flat, and Simone Forti’s See-Saw (Carroll 
2003:93–94). He went on to note another effect of the new dance. It 
attacked the barrier between high and low art, as did Roy Lichtenstein and 
Andy Warhol in painting and Claes Oldenburg in sculpture. For example, 
“[i]n Elaine Summer’s Suite, the last section is organized around the then-
popular dance, the Twist. Not only did the dancers twist, but the audience 
was invited to join in” (94). Audience participation collectivizes the artistic 
subject, as the audience members become cocreators in the work, similar 
to what Bertolt Brecht hoped to achieve theatrically. This erasure of the 
subject, really a socialization of the subject, clearly belongs to high mod-
ernism rather than postmodernism as some critics and exponents claim.
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Another implication of capturing ordinary gestures for artistic creativ-
ity is potentially liberating a crucial part of the habitus of communication. 
George Herbert Mead (1934) argued that the self was a social artifact. 
Interaction among people created the self mainly through what he called 
significant symbols. Mead’s significant symbols closely resemble C. S. Peirce’s 
concept of symbolic sign relations in which a sign comes into relation to 
an object through an interpretant that is rule governed. Social norms con-
stitute the rules. The most palpable and arguably most frequent traffic in 
significant symbols takes verbal form—speaking, writing, singing, and so 
on. Nonetheless, face-to-face interaction contains many gestures, a part of 
what linguists categorize as pragmatics. When the new dance appropriated 
the everyday exchange of gestures, it aestheticized not only ordinary com-
munication but self-building. What Mead discursively explained for a rar-
efied academic audience, high modern dance realized for the masses. Selves 
became something we all have a say in creating. We do it every day when we 
interact with our fellows, just as the audience participated in the creation of 
Suite by dancing the Twist. This kind of high modernist liberation contains 
the germ of a solution to the essential alienation of capitalism. Work—human 
labor—remains definitive for the species. As a species, humans create their 
own primary ecological niche; they make culture. Capitalist social relations 
just as essentially force most people to alienate their creative capacity. Those 
who do not live by investment have to sell that which makes them human, 
their work. Recapturing creative productivity can rectify the alienation.
Feminism
Just as dance enjoined ordinary gesture, feminism, in its so-called second-
wave beginning in the late 1960s, challenged a fundamental category of 
alienation. It challenged gendered identity and the processes that construct 
it. Those processes flit between conscious and unconscious, between vol-
untary and coerced, a point made by Richard T. Ford by reference to learn-
ing the Tango. Relying on ideas from Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, Ford 
described a female Tango student who finds “it easier to conform to the 
female role than to attack the Tango’s structure. . . . Over time conformity 
will become ‘second nature.’” Eventually, she forgets any urge to resist the 
relative passivity of the female’s Tango role; “[a]t that point the status will 
also have become her identity” (Ford 1999:857). The status, of course, is 
gender, in which the Tango is another building block in the apparent natu-
ral and biologically authorized category. Ford goes on to compare gender 
statuses to jurisdictional statuses, the legal statuses conferred by jurisdic-
tional boundaries, such as citizenship. There are degrees of citizenship, 
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as bearers of marginalized statuses continually rediscover. The feminist 
challenge reverberated through all sectors of mid-twentieth century society 
and culture. Nonetheless, its most terrifying threat to the elite pertained to 
gender’s role in the main social unit of reproduction, the family. Families 
have long been the site not only of procreation and primary socialization, 
but also as social institutions that allow capital formations to externalize 
costs. Employers do not employ those who toil to reproduce waged workers. 
“The modern feminist movement has challenged the arbitrary theoreti-
cal separation of production from reproduction in the process reducing 
how  material and social existence can be conceptualized” (Rowbotham 
1992:278). Moreover, families in their spatial manifestations—house-
holds—are key centers of consumerism, a critical part of the market in soci-
eties that are centers of world capitalism. As Sheila Rowbotham recounted,
We were prepared to challenge every sexual convention, yet woefully igno-
rant often of contraception, abortion, and our bodies. We faced contradic-
tory attitudes toward female sexuality and we were part of a ferment in 
which received theories and authority of every kind was contested. Every 
aspect of life was political. 
(Rowbotham 1992:261)
Second-wave feminism surfaced in the 1960s. Its formation came from 
the civil rights movement. After sexual discrimination appeared in the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, in an effort by opponents to stop its passage, Betty 
Friedan formed NOW, the National Organization of Women (258). One 
point of departure for the women’s movement began with “rap” groups 
devoted to consciousness raising. The advantage lay in exploring episte-
mological alternatives to patriarchy to assess social conditions and form 
preliminary strategies followed by emancipatory actions. This beginning 
also had two disadvantages. First, relying on small group discussions 
tended to overemphasize individualistic, personal relations. Second, self-
selected groups tended to be homogeneous with respect to other social 
divisions: race, class, sexual orientation, and so on. As discussed below, 
the elite reaction against feminism exploited both these disadvantages by 
using the first to blunt and divert its revolutionary potential and the sec-
ond to foment divisiveness. Nonetheless, second-wave feminism presented 
a major challenge to the hierarchical status quo.
In a 1998 reflective essay reviewing her earlier essay, Nancy Hartsock 
restated Camus’ “I rebel, therefore we are.” She wrote:
First, rather than getting rid of subjectivity, oppressed groups need to 
engage in the historical, political, and theoretical process of constituting 
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ourselves as subjects as well as objects of history. We need to sort out who we 
really are and in the process dissolve this false “we” into its real multiplicity 
and variety (240). 
In the essay, Hartsock also makes clear that liberated understandings and 
self-constitution come from material social and political struggle—that is, 
praxis. Success for the project of liberation does not rely on the particular 
understandings of individual rebels. The issue is not an opinion poll or 
social survey, but what Hartsock calls a “standpoint” drawing on Lukács’ 
History and Class Consciousness. “Rather a standpoint is a technical device 
that can allow for the creation of better (more objective, more liberatory) 
accounts of the world. Thus, I make no claim about the actual conscious-
ness of existing women” (Hartsock 1998:236). Feminism contained a 
severe challenge because it could realize subjective and universal liberation 
by conjoining the two goals. As a slogan of the times went, the personal 
is the political. As it turned out, this revolutionary potential of feminism 
did not succeed any more than the revolutionary potentials of any of the 
political, social, and cultural movements of the high modern period. The 
elite struck back against all of them, and in the process put an end to mod-
ernism, which presaged the end of modernity.
After Modernism
David Harvey began his 1989 study by observing that “[t]here has been 
a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since 
around 1972. This sea-change is bound up with the emergence of new 
dominant ways in which we experience space and time” (vii).
The sea change did not occur from inexorable trends of social trans-
formation. On the contrary, the causes of the sea change reversed many 
of those trends. The elites, first in the United States and then followed by 
those in other countries central to the world system, carried out a deliber-
ate, concerted, and conscious campaign to reverse the trends of modernity. 
Although there are a variety of documents that reveal the campaign, none 
do it so concisely and clearly as a memorandum by the soon to be U.S. 
Supreme Court justice, Lewis Powell, in 1971. Powell, one of Virginia’s 
upper crust, was a partner in the law firm of Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell 
and Gibson, now called Hunton and Williams LLP, which employs over a 
thousand lawyers. Powell specialized in mergers and acquisitions in corpo-
rate law. Nixon nominated him to the Supreme Court simultaneously with 
his nomination of William Rhenquist. Powell had a friend and neighbor, 
Eugene Sydnor, who was director of education for the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. Conversations between them led to Powell’s memorandum, 
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intended to be secret, which outlined a counterattack by the ruling class 
against perceived threats to its power, wealth, and privilege. Tracing its 
direct impact would present an impossible task, but reading it after the 
reactionary onslaught of the late twentieth century, it offered what seems 
to be a blueprint for that counterattack. Calling on corporate leaders and 
the owning class of America, Powell (1971) proposed an eleven-point pro-
gram of where and how to carry out the counterattack.
 1. The campus, especially social science faculties; support right-thinking 
scholars and academics; suppress radical organizations.
 2. Influence and, where possible, control the news media, especially 
television.
 3. Influence the selection of government staffers, consultants, and 
experts.
 4. Support right-thinking politicians in elections.
 5. Support independent lecturers, writers, scholars, and others who 
shape culture.
 6. Push universities to include more right-thinking faculty.
 7. Evaluate textbooks and other publications; support those expressing 
right thinking.
 8. After universities, carry on the fight in high schools.
 9. Conduct a systematic public relations campaign in favor of elite 
capitalists’ interests. 
 10. Support publications of right-thinking scholars in publications.
 11. Get involved in adjudication; support right-thinking lawyers and 
judges.
It was not too long after his memorandum that the dawn of a new kind 
of postmodern analysis began to appear on the horizon for intellectual 
circles. France presents an interesting case, because the intellectuals who 
constituted what was originally called poststructuralism began having 
their works published and translated to English with remarkable rapidity. 
The French invasion of the 1970s was underway. Another aspect to this 
French wave lay in the backgrounds of many if not most of the scholars. 
They had been involved in The Events of May 1968, the Parisian rebellion 
that brought workers and students together. The strikes and other actions 
of those events and the worker-student coalition itself not only suffered 
intransigence from the French establishment, but the Communists, 
Socialists, and largest labor union confederation repudiated the rebel-
lion, thus thwarting its revolutionary potential. What followed resembled 
the effect of the collapse of the U.S. left in the face of the red scare 
after the Second World War, popularly known as McCarthyism. Then, 
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anti-Stalinists, so-called Trotskyites, and various other non-Communists 
social ists turned abruptly to the right, often in obscurantist ways. That 
turn spawned what became known as neoconservatism with such lights 
as Irving Krystal and Norman Podhoretz. Meeting in the United States in 
the 1970s, these two intellectual strains—the poststructuralists and neo-
conservatives—led to a dialectical dynamic that provided the discursive 
elements of  postmodernism. Gestating in intellectual circles and organiza-
tions, epigones of these superficially contradictory ideologies soon began 
to populate positions of policy making in government and business.
Michel Foucault’s theory of power exemplifies the French poststruc-
tural turn. It is a flawed version of some of the theories of social con-
trol articulated by early Chicago School sociologists. Foucault used the 
metaphor of capillary action to describe power dynamics—an upward 
flow from pervasive systems of roots. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattori 
(1972, 1980) used the term “rhizome” as a similar, though not identical, 
metaphor. This model takes power as an effect of modern societies with 
its complex imbrications of relationships and institutions as opposed 
to power emanating from the state or ruling class. That model opposes 
Louis Althusser’s (1965; Althusser and Balibar 1968) so-called structural 
Marxism, which posited a social structure in which the ruling class used its 
control of state apparatuses to order social relations. Two main state appa-
ratuses are those of force such as police or military and ideological such 
as schools. Foucault not only rejected the structural model but specifi-
cally excluded physical force saying that power and freedom are mutually 
necessary.
When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the 
actions of others, when one characterizes these actions as the government 
of men by other men—in the broadest sense of the term—one includes an 
important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects and 
only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects 
who are faced with a field of possibilities. . . . Where the determining fac-
tors saturate the whole there is no relationship when a man is in chains. . . . 
The relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot 
therefore be separated. 
(Foucault 1982:221)
Perhaps unaware of the connection, Foucault did not cite the concept of 
social control that stemmed from Edward Alsworth Ross, who introduced 
the idea (1901). In keeping with the liberal orientation of Progressivism 
of the early twentieth century in the United States, Ross took a social psy-
chological approach to human behavior similar to that of Charles Horton 
Cooley (1902). “Rather than a conception of ‘state’ or ‘civilization’ which 
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imposes its coercive, external ‘law’ on ‘human nature’, the new conceptual-
ization was that of an order which stems from social interaction” (Melossi 
1987:28). 
Foucault called “pastoral” the kind of power most prevalent in liberal, 
Western societies. Characteristics of pastoral power are (1) an ultimate 
aim to ensure individual salvation; (2) agents who are willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the good of the flock; (3) devotion to the care of individuals 
throughout their lives; and (4) knowledge of the inside of people’s minds. 
In its modern, secular form, pastoral power relies on an individualizing 
tactic associated with institutions such as the family, medicine, psychiatry, 
and employment (Foucault 1982). It might seem that the force of control, 
or power, in such institutions resides mainly in ideas—that is, power is 
ideological. Foucault explicitly abjured a connection with the Marxist 
concept of ideological domination. 
I think I would distinguish myself from both the Marxist and the para-
Marxist perspectives. As regards Marxism, I’m not one of those who try to 
elicit the effects of power at the level of ideology. . . . Because what troubles 
me with these analyses which prioritize ideology is that there is always pre-
supposed a human subject on the lines of the mode provided by classical 
philosophy endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to 
seize on (1980:58). 
Foucault elaborated on his idea of a subjectless society by denying the effi-
cacy of communication. “What defines a relationship of power is that it is 
a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. 
Instead it acts on others’ actions” (1982:220). Foucault’s version of power 
seems more like a tennis match where one player acts on the actions of 
the other by hitting the ball. It does not comport with ideas of self, ego, or 
personhood emerging from social interactions and symbolic transaction 
as one finds in modernist thinkers such as Sigmund Freud (1923), George 
Herbert Mead (1934), or Georg Simmel (1900). It does not fit with the 
anthropological finding that persons, as opposed to biological individu-
als, emerge from social interaction and cultural systems—all of which are 
thoroughly compatible with Marx’s concept of persons emerging from 
productive relations. The problem Foucault thought he addressed is not 
so much within Marx’s writings, but those of some structuralist inter-
preters. That problem arises because Marxian structuralism has a ten-
dency to overlook human agency. The solution seems to require some 
kind of preexisting atoms—that is, subjects upon whom social forces act. 
Unfortunately, Foucault’s solution does not resolve the question of agency; 
it sinks the analysis in an even worse quagmire. Foucault’s notion of power 
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enunciates a postmodern individuality where there is no subject. There 
is nobody to blame. There is no slave and no master. Foucault’s power 
depends on accepting the spectacle of reified commodities, like tennis 
balls, where people do not interact with one another directly, but always 
and only through mediated things. Individual choice can reign supreme 
because its effects are only things, the fruits of others actions. 
The U.S. intelligentsia eagerly welcomed Foucault. At the same time, 
he and his compatriot poststructuralists gained currency, neoconservative 
American intellectuals plied their wares with the support and influence of 
the ruling class. In political economy, it was Neoliberalism, in other fields, 
neoconservatism. The two philosophies differ mainly by name, because 
in practice the liberality in neoliberalism applies only to the ruling class. 
A University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman recuperated Frederick 
Hayek’s theories, based on the economists of the monopoly capitalism and 
neocolonialism of Britain and France at the end of the nineteenth century: 
Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882), and 
Marie-Esprit-Léon Walras (1834–1910). Their central thesis used marginal 
utility to displace the classical economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
and Karl Marx (Harvey 2005:20). It relied on a strategy of the capital 
centers—New York, London, and Tokyo most prominently—extracting 
wealth from the periphery of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The neo-
liberal political economics ostensibly advocated free enterprise and indi-
vidual responsibility while relying on state power, including military force, 
to ensure market dominance. At the domestic level, the ideas of James Q. 
Wilson supported a kind of social control through police power that aimed 
at dominating redundant populations who typically offered the greatest 
threat and rebellious potential. The success of such ideas depended on 
restructured class relations and control of outlets for cultural products. 
In apparent contrast to Foucault and other poststructuralists, the neocon-
servative philosophy did not deny preexisting subjects. It made them the 
end-all and be-all of analysis. It dismissed social formations such as class, 
race, and gender as methodologically unnecessary at best and imaginary at 
worst. Neoconservative approaches proceed as if there were no such things 
as social forces, only individual choice. 
The apparent contrast between neoconservatism and poststructuralism 
fueled a phony culture war. Neoconservatives attacked the poststructural 
trend as nihilist and amoral. Poststructuralists attacked the neoconserva-
tives as naïve and archaic. Occluded by the dispute carried on in rarefied 
academic venues were real political issues. While the political right shored 
up ruling-class economic interests, it simultaneously made value-laden 
appeals to such constituencies as fundamentalist Christians, libertarian-
minded new professionals, and older, blue-collar manual laborers. 
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Abortion, sexuality, and other moralistic matters became vanguard issues 
for the first target, fundamentalists. New professionals received enor-
mously expanded markets in heretofore-restricted commodities largely 
devoted to narcissistic appeals. New York City provided the test case. After 
the bankers’ takeover of the city following its debt default in 1975, the 
elite mobilized to sell its image as a culture center and tourist destination. 
They supported the opening of the cultural field to diverse cosmopolitan 
interests. “The narcissistic exploration of self, sexuality, and identity 
became the leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture” (Harvey 2005:47).
Blue-collar workers had their fears of shrinking opportunities diverted 
by racial scapegoating and encouragements to their self-image as middle 
class as opposed to working class. These so-called Reagan Democrats 
flocked to the image of a renewed American culture where they once again 
could assume a crucial position, as in the postwar slogan about them as 
the most productive workers in the world. By diverting and manipulating 
imagery and hot button issues through control of the culture industry, 
modernism gave way to postmodernism. It also disguised real political 
issues (Frank 2004; Gramsci 1971:149; Harvey 2005:39–60). Postmodern 
culture served to divert resistant energies to straw men and blunt the 
impact of liberatory art and literature. At the same time, marginalized 
peoples, both within the metropoles and the periphery, felt the effects of 
force. As of 2008, the United States had incarcerated 2.3 million people, 
about half of whom were African American. The United States and its 
allies carried war to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other less-noticed theaters 
such as Somalia and Colombia. 
Identity politics came to the aid of the revanchist political strategy of 
the ruling class. The high modern era helped spawn liberation movements 
of those subordinated by race, gender, class, and other  marginalizations. 
Those movements aimed at freedom, equality, and justice for all. Post-
modernism encouraged division by status identity. The political field 
began to resemble mass marketing, where market segmentation became 
a main strategy in advertising and public relations. Postmodern style pro -
gressively subsumed modernism throughout the last decades of the 
twentieth century. By the end of the century, art had reached exhausted 
dead ends in all major fields of endeavor. The visual arts merely rehashed 
former articulations (Hopkins 2000). Other artistic fields followed the 
same pattern. It was not that artists stopped painting, film makers stopped 
making movies, composers stopped writing music, but, while particular 
works could have a freshness, they presented no challenge to people’s lives 
and perceptions as had modernism. No postmodern painter challenged 
the way people see, as cubism had done. No composer challenged hear-
ing like Schönberg, no choreographer the way people move like Martha 
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Graham or Isadora Duncan, no writers like Kafka or Joyce to challenge 
understandings of daily life, and so on. 
Postmodern art offered no challenges, because postmodernity loomed 
on the horizon. The world political economy was moribund. Chaos would 
reign. In the last decades of the twentieth century, artists could only envi-
sion an inchoate future, one with as yet no templates for a new system. 
The situation resembled that of early fifteenth century Europe. By mid-
century, innovations and changes in society and culture began to shape 
the new system. But in the 1980s and 1990s, there was no equivalent to 
linear perspective to help form a new vision, a new way of seeing, and a 
new consciousness.
